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THE BISHOPS AND THE CORPORATE STAKEHOLDER DEBATE
Stephen M. Bainbridge*
Should directors of public corporations take into account the interests of corporate
constituencies other than shareholders when making decisions? More to the point, at least for
purposes of this conference, should faith-based investors encourage directors so to do?' These
questions, of course, are a subset of the broader corporate social responsibility debate.
The broader debate asks whether shareholder wealth maximization should be the guiding
principle of corporate governance or whether internal corporate decisionmaking processes should
include consideration of various social issues. The narrower debate at issue here focuses on the
corporation's responsibility to so-called stakeholders: nonshareholder corporate constituents,
such as employees, customers, suppliers, and local communities in which the corporation does
business.2 On one side are those who argue that corporate actions affect not only shareholders,
but also a variety of norihareholder constituencies having legitimate claims on the corporation.
Employees, customers, creditors, suppliers, and the communities in which the firm does business
all have a stake in the corporate enterprise and are entitled to have their interests considered.3 On
the other side are those who argue for the primacy of shareholder interests.4 Those in this camp
argue, as Milton Friedman famously put it, that "the social responsibility of business is to
increase its profits."
5
Professor, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW. I thank Samuel Gregg for his comments, as well as my fellow panelists,
Robert Kennedy and Margaret Blair. The usual disclaimers apply, of course. © 2002 Stephen M. Bainbridge.
1 Leading spokesmen for values-based investing routinely emphasize concern for nonshareholder constituents in
connection with both investment and corporate governance decisions. See, e.g., AMY DOMINI, SOCIALLY
RESPONSIBLE INVESTING: MAKING A DIFFERENCE AND MAKING MONEY 66 (2001) (noting the need for "stakeholder
impact data" in making investment decisions); HAL BRILL ET AL., INVESTING WITHYOUR VALUES: MAKING MONEY
AND MAKING A DIFFERENCE 89-91 (2d ed. 2000) (identifying investment screens with strong emphasis on
stakeholders).
2 The term "stakeholders" reportedly originated in a 1963 Stanford Research Institute memorandum as a descriptive
term for "those groups without whose support the organization would cease to exist." R. Edward Freeman & David
L. Reed, Stockholders and Stakeholders: A New Perspective on Corporate Governance, 25 CAL. MGMT. REV. 88,
89 (1983).
3 See infra Part I (describing the relevant Catholic social teaching).
4 See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (quoting and discussing Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668
(Mich. 1919)). In this essay, the term "shareholder primacy" is used synonymously with the so-called "shareholder
wealth maximization norm." Under either name, the principle requires boards of directors to focus on shareholder
wealth maximization when making corporate decisions. See id. In recent years, some scholars have expanded the
concept of shareholder primacy to include not only the proposition that shareholders are the principals on whose
behalf corporate governance is organized, but also the claim that shareholders do (and should) exercise ultimate
control of the corporate enterprise. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 440-41 (2001) (describing the "standard shareholder-oriented" model). As used in
this essay, however, the term "shareholder primacy" does not encompass this broader conception. For a critique of
the shareholder primacy norm, as more broadly defined by Hansmann and Kraakman (among others), see Stephen
M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, NW. U. L. lWV. (forthcoming
2003).
5 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 13,
1970, at 32.
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Catholic social teaching on work and capitalism offers a provocative statement of natural
law principles with considerable relevance to the stakeholder debate. It therefore serves as my
principal foil herein, albeit without intending thereby to denigrate or exclude other religious
traditions. 6 In particular, I devote considerable attention to the moral and ethical claims advanced
by the U.S. Catholic Bishops in their controversial pastoral letter on economic justice. 7
As a relatively recent convert to Catholicism, it is with some trepidation that I take issue
with certain aspects of the social teaching. 8 As with all of the Church's ordinary teaching, the
faithful "are to adhere to [the social teaching] with religious asset." 9 Yet the church encourages
lay initiative "especially when the matter involves discovering or inventing the means for
permeating social, political, and economic realities with the demands of Christian doctrine and
life." 10 Moreover, an active and critical role for the laity seems especially important with respect
to economic life. Michael Novak asserts that Christian theologians tend to be poorly trained in
6 Cf MICHAEL NOVAK, CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT & LIBERAL INSTITUTIONS: FREEDOM WITH JUSTICE xxiii (2d
ed. 2000) (stating that "all who are concerned with the moral and religious quality of human systems should find
[the Catholic social] tradition both instructive in itself and parallel to developments in their own intellectual
histories").
7 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: PASTORAL LETTER ON CATHOLIC
SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE U.S. ECONOMY (1986) [hereinafter BISHOPS' LETTER]. A firestorm of criticism
surrounded the BISHOPS' LETTER. A relatively diverse and representative spectrum of views, as well as a copy of the
letter itself, is contained in THE CATHOLIC CHALLENGE TO THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: REFLECTIONS ON TE U.S.
BISHOPS' PASTORAL LETTER ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE U.S. RONOMY (Thomas M. Gannon ed.,
1987).
8 1 trust this concern will not seem misplaced at a conference on faith-based investing, even though I realize that
many academics will find it eccentric, at best. As Thomas Shaffer pointedly observed, modern law schools "have
systematically-theologically! discounted, discouraged and disapproved of the invocation of the religious tradition
as important, or even interesting." Thomas Shaffer, The Tension Between Law in America and the Religious
Tradition, in THE WEIGHTIER MATTERS OF THE LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND RELIGION 315, 327 (John Witte & Frank
Alexander eds., 1988).
9 UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 892 (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter
CATECHISM].
10 Id. at 899. Villanova Law School Dean Mark Sargent observes that "the Catholic university-and hence, the
Catholic law school-is where the Church does its thinking." Mark A. Sargent, An Alternative to the Sectarian
Vision: The Role of the Dean in an Inclusive Catholic Law School, 33 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 171, 181 (2001). In my
view, one properly may generalize Sargent's proposition to the believing laity as a whole. Hence, it is the task of
Catholic intellectuals to exercise critical reflective judgment with respect to society, the Church, and the relationship
between the two. On the other hand, I recognize that there is a fine line between the exercise of critical evaluative
judgment and dissent. On the legitimacy of dissent from the magisterium of the Church, compare Christopher
Wolfe, The Ideal of a (Catholic) Law School, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 487, 497-98 (1995) (arguing there is no "right to
dissent" as that term is broadly understood) with Michael J. Perry, The Idea of a Catholic University, 78 MARQ. L.
REV. 325, 346 (1995) (arguing that "Catholics can and do, without forfeiting our identity as Catholics, dissent from
one or another theological proposition"). In the present context, however, there seems no need to resolve this debate.
When it comes to issues such as the degree of state intervention in the economy, for example, the Church outlines
basic principles but recognizes substantial latitude with respect to their translation into public policy. Nowhere, for
example, does the Church state what percentage of the economy should by controlled by the state, thus leaving a
great deal of room for prudential judgement by Catholics. In promulgating their pastoral letter, moreover, the
Bishops expressly acknowledged that their "prudential judgments" about specific policy recommendations were not
made "with the same kind of authority that marks our declarations of principle." BISHOPS' LETTER, supra note 7, at
xii.
2
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economics and inexperienced with the business world. They "are likely to inherit either a pre-
capitalist or a frankly socialist set of ideals about political economy."'" Consequently,
theologians "are more likely to err in this territory [i.e., economic justice] than in most others." 12
The exercise of critical evaluative judgment seems especially appropriate with respect to
the analysis and claims made in the BISHOPS' LETTER. Although Pope John Paul II has cautioned
that the Catholic "church has no models to present," 13 the BISHOPS' LETTER claimed to speak not
only to Catholics but also to U.S. society at large. 14 In a very real sense, the BISHOPS' LETTER
was not only a theological document, but also a position paper addressed to policymakers.
15
Consequently, it seems fair to question whether one can find sound social policy in the Bishops'
moral and ethical claims.
The Bishops agreed with those who believe that corporate directors should consider the
interests of nonshareholder corporate constituents when making business decisions; indeed, they
argued that directors are morally obligated to do so. 16 In this essay, I argue the Bishops' thesis is
flawed in two respects. First, the normative arguments they advanced do not justify setting aside
corporate law's traditional focus on shareholder wealth maximization. Second, despite the
position paper-like nature of the BISHOPS' LETTER, the Bishops failed to grapple with the
fundamental problems inherent in giving corporate managers discretion to consider concerns
other than shareholder wealth maximization.
To be sure, on its face, the BISHOPS' LETTER merely states a moral norm--it did not
purport to make specific law reform proposals. Absent law reform, however, the BISHOPS'
LETTER presented faithful directors with the difficult moral dilemma of reconciling their moral
and legal obligations. When this concern is coupled with the general policy orientation of the
BISHOPS' LETTER, it seems fair to treat the Bishops' position as an implicit law reform proposal
intended to align the directors' moral and legal duties. Hence, my focus here is on the question of
whether the positive law should incorporate the Bishops' understanding of the board's moral
role. Unfortunately, the Bishops provide little guidance as to how this might be done-a
MICHAEL NOVAK, TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF THE CORPORATION 59 (rev. ed. 1990).
12Id. at 12.
13 John Paul II, Centesimus Annus 43, reprinted in PROCLAIMING JUSTICE & PEACE: PAPAL DOCUMENTS FROM
RERUM NOIARUM THROUGH CENTESIMUS AANUS 432, 465 (Michael Walsh & Brian Davies eds., 1991). Some
Catholic intellectuals contend that Centesimus Annus calls into question "the controlling assumptions" of the
BISHOPS' LETTER and even that it provides a basis for rejecting the pastoral letter "as unrepresentative of the
Church's authoritative teaching." Richard John Neuhaus, An Argument About Human Nature, in A NEW WORLDLY
ORDER: JOHN PAUL II AND HUMAN FREEDOM 123, 124 (George Weigel ed., 1992). If this perspective suggests
caution in over-emphasizing the BISHOPS' LETTER in an analysis of Catholic social teaching on corporate social
responsibility, it also suggests the legitimacy of applying critical evaluative judgment to the specific policy
proposals contained therein. See also supra note 10 (discussing the legitimacy of dissent).
14 See, e.g., BISHOPS' LETTER, supra note 7, at 7 27 (stating that the Bishops desired "to add our voice to the public
debate").
15 See id.
16 See id. at TT 298-306. The Bishops did not impose a comparable moral obligation on shareholders in connection
with their decisionmaking capacity. Instead, they called for further research on the relationship of shareholders and
nonshareholder constituents. See id. at 306. Although the question has obvious relevance for faith-based investors,
this essay declines the Bishops' invitation.
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common failing of Catholic social teaching. 17 The Church tends to be long on pious exhortations
and short on detailed policy prescriptions. The broad amorphous statements of moral norms
typical of Catholic social teaching (and much commentary thereon) are a blunt instrument poorly
suited to the sort of fine detail work demanded of lawyers, judges, and legislators.
Part I of this essay briefly summarizes the position taken by the BISHOPS' LETTER on the
stakeholder debate, placing that position within the context of the broader Catholic social
teaching, as well as offering a preliminary critique of the normative underpinnings of the
Bishops' position. Part II then evaluates three ways in which the Bishops' position might be
translated into public policy: (1) directors could be given nonreviewable discretion to make
trade-offs between shareholder and stakeholder interests; (2) directors could be given reviewable
discretion to make such trade-offs; or (3) directors could be required to make such trade-offs
subject to judicial (or regulatory) oversight. None of these approaches is an improvement on
current law; to the contrary, all are worse. The first approach would be toothless, the second
would increase agency costs, and the third would either prove unworkable or pose an
unwarranted threat to economic liberty (or both).
I. THE BISHOPS' LETTER AND THE STAKEHOLDER DEBATE
A. A BRIEF NOTE ON METHODOLOGY
Are instrumental and wnsequentialist considerations an appropriate basis on which to
critique the Bishops' analysis? In particular, is concern with economic efficiency relevant to that
critique? 18 In my judgment, an instrumental analysis can be instructive. Although cost-benefit
analysis may strike a discordant note in an essay on Catholic social teaching, concern for
efficiency is a legitimate element of the methodology by which that teaching is worked out,
analyzed, and critiqued.
The Church's social teaching rests on a foundation of natural law principles. 19 In turn,
natural law consists of "a loosely-knit body of rules of action prescribed by an authority superior
17 See Scott Fitzgibbon, "True Human Community": Catholic Social Thought, Aristotelian Ethics, and the Moral
Order of the Business Company, 45 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 1243, 1247-52 (2001) (arguing that Catholic moral treatises
are unhelpful in dealing with practical problems of business ethics).
18 Economic efficiency can be defined in various ways. The Pareto superiority efficiency is satisfied when a change
makes at least one person better off and no one worse off. In contrast, Kaldor-Hlicks efficiency does not require that
no one be made worse off by a reallocation of resources. instead, it requires only a net social wealth increase, such that
the gains to the "winners" exceed the losses incurred by the "losers." Moreover, there is no requirement that the
winners compensate the losers. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13-14 (4th ed. 1992) (defining
efficiency concepts). For purposes of this essay, I accept Kaldor-Hicks as a working definition of economic efficiency.
I acknowledge, however, that the ethical validity of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as a guide to public policy is sharply
disputed. Compare RICHARD A. POSNER, T-E ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 91-94 (1981) (defending Kaldor-Hicks) with
Bruce Chapman, Trust, Economic Rationality, and the Corporate Fiduciary Obligation, 43 U. Toronto L. Rev. 547,
554-55 (1993) (noting arguments against use of Kaldor-Hicks as a guide to social policymaking).
19 See Angela C. Carmella, A Catholic View of Law and Justice, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT
255, 258 (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001) (noting the "natural-law emphasis in Catholic social thought");
see also MICHAEL NOVAK, THE CATHOLIC ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 51 (1993) (noting the importance
of "natural justice" and "natural rights" in Pope Leo Xlii's seminal encyclical on economic justice, Rerum
Novarum).
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to the state." 2° But what authority? Russell Kirk explained that the different schools of natural
law derive the principles of that law variously from "divine commandment, from right reason
with which man is endowed by his Creator, from the nature of mankind empirically regarded,
from the abstract Reason of the Enlightenment, or from the long experience of humankind in the
community." 21 Among these options, Catholic social teaching draws principally on philosophical
reasoning and revealed truth.22 The Catholic perspective thus is not inconsistent with Edmund
Burke's description of natural law as "eternal enactments of divine authority which we can
endeavor to apprehend through the study of history and the observation of human character."
23
Central to the intellectual apparatus by which we discern the "eternal enactments of
divine authority" is what John Finnis calls the test of practical reasonableness. 24 Practical
reasoning is a way of thinking about how things ought to be, using rational arguments about how
people ought to behave. 25 Or, as Finnis put it, practical reasoning is the natural law method of
"working out the (moral) natural law from the first (pre-moral) principles of natural law."26 In
particular, it is a way of choosing "commitments, projects, and actions, knowing that choice
20 Russell Kirk, Natural Law and the Constitution of the United States, 69NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1036 (1994).
21 Id.
22 See Carmella, supra note 19, at 258 (noting that Catholic social thought has "become more expressly biblical and
christological" in addition to its traditional emphasis on philosophy). Of course, skeptics deny that the truth of a
moral principle can be established. At best, they regard moral norms as indeterminate "can't helps." Yet, the genuine
immo rality of an act is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the legitimacy of its legal prohibition. See
Gerard V. Bradley, Pluralistic Perfectionism: A Review Essay of MAKING MEN MORAL, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 671,
674-75 (1996) (positing that "the immorality of acts is relevant to the legitimacy of their legal prohibition"). Because
all conceptions of the good necessarily invoke nonderivable moral assumptions, we cannot avoid an inquiry into the
morality of an act we propose to regulate. See Bobby Jindal, Relativism, Neutrality, and Transcendentalism: Beyond
Autonomy, 57 LA. L. REV. 1253, 1253 (1997).
23 RUSSELL KIRK, TIE CONSERVATIVE MIND: FROM BURKE TO ELIOT 49 (7th ed. 1993) (paraphrasing Burke on
natural rights).
24 See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 100-27 (1980) (defining and describing the test of
practical reason). Practical reasonableness is only part of Finnis's jurisprudence of natural law, the totality of which
consists mostly of lists. He begins with a list of seven "basic values": life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience,
friendship, practical reasonableness, and religion. Id. at 86-90. In turn, the test of practical reasonableness consists of
a list of nine requirements: a coherent plan of life, no arbitrary preferences among value, no arbitrary preferences
among persons, detachment, commitment, efficiency, respect for every basic value in every act, the common good,
and following one's conscience. See id. at 103-26. Each of the seven basic values are said to be of equal importance;
Finnis denies that it is possible to rank them. See id. at 92-93. Instead, an important component of practical
reasonableness is making decisions in a way that does not directly damage any of the seven basic values. See id. at
119-20. Because Finnis defines natural law as being concerned with "good and proper conduct," not drafting
positive legislation, he is willing to accept the resulting indeterminacy. Id. at 18. Indeed, Finnis acknowledges that
"the integration of even an uncontroversial requirement of practical reasonableness into the [positive] law will not
be a simple matter." Id. at 284. For criticism of Finnis' reliance on lists, his proposed list of basic values, and his
definition of practical reasonableness, see generally William H. Wilcox, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 408 (1983) (book review).
25 See Steven J. Burton, Judge Posner's Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 87 MICH. L. REV. 710, 715 (1988) (arguing that
"a more complete assimilation of the practical perspective of the legal actor would under cut Judge Posner's argument
for legal skepticism").
26 FINNIS, supra note 24, at 103 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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effectively rules out many alternative reasonable or possible commitment(s), project(s), and
action(s)." 27
Finnis, of course, is a leading critic of consequentialist reasoning. 28 Hence, he
presumably would argue that practical reasonableness should not be confused with a purely
instrumental approach to natural law. At the same time, however, Finnis concedes that one
should seek to achieve the good by actions that are efficient for their purposes. 29 As he
acknowledges, "[o]ne must not waste one's opportunities by using inefficient methods." 30 If even
a prominent nonconsequentialist is willing to admit that cost-benefit analysis comes into play
when analyzing natural law claims, it seems we may do so with some confidence.
B. THEBISHOPS' POLICY POSITION
No one seriously denies that corporate conduct generates negative externalities. 31 Instead,
debate tends to focus on two issues. First, what conduct in fact gives rise to externalities about
which there should be legitimate concern? Second, and more pertinent to the topic at hand, how
should true negative externalities be regulated? The standard welfare economics answer, of
course, is to induce the actor to internalize the full social cost of his conduct. 32 Yet, even setting
aside the thorny problem of how to incent corporate actors,3 3 one still must ask whether it makes
sense to give corporate directors discretion to consider the effects of their decisions on
nonshareholder constituencies.
American corporate law has rejected extending the board's discretionary authority that
far. As the Michigan supreme court famously explained in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. 34
27 Id. at 100.
28 See id. at 112 (asserting consequentialist reasoning to be "irrational").
29 See id. at 111.
30 Id. To be sure, Finnis constrains the efficiency criterion by reference to other moral criteria. See id. at 112 (setting out
a list of criteria over and above mere efficiency); cf SAMUEL GREGG, THE ART OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 25
(2001) (arguing that it would be "morally negligent" to ignore consequences, but also positing that "consideration of
consequences is not sufficient forjudging" the morality of actions; emphasis in original).
31 It is for this reason that one cannot justify the shareholder wealth maximization norm by claiming that a rising tide
lifts all boats. In many cases, a rising tide will lift affected vessels. Nonshareholder constituencies have a claim on
the corporation that is both fixed and prior to that of the shareholders. So long as general welfare laws prohibit the
corporation from imposing negative externalities on those constituencies, the shareholder wealth maximization norm
redounds to their benefit. In some cases, however, the rising tide argument is inapplicable because it fails to take
into account the question of risk. Pursuing shareholder wealth maximization often requires one to make risky
decisions, which disadvantages nonshareholder constituencies. The increased return associated with an increase in
risk does not benefit nonshareholders, because their claim is fixed, whereas the simultaneous increase in the
corporation's riskiness makes it less likely that nonshareholder claims will be satisfied. Hence, the rising tide
argument cannot be a complete explanation for the shareholder wealth maximization norm.
32 See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 39-40 (2d ed. 1997) (asserting the
internalization of social costs to be desirable public policy).
33 The problem is aptly summarized by an aphorism commonly attributed to Edward, First Baron Thurlow: "Did you
ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked?"
PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 398 (1960).
34 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
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A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion
of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end and does not
extend to a change in the end iself, to the reduction of profits or to the nondistribution of
35profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.
At first blush, this legal doctrine ought to strike Christians as unpalatable, if not worse. Is not
"the love of money the root of all evils"? 3 6 Did not Christ himself tell us that we "cannot serve
both God and money?,, 37 Does not the Bible repeatedly teach us that there are many things more
important than wealth, not least of which is the fear of the Lord? How then can Christians
associate themselves with a normative principle explicitly htended to maximize wealth, and
whose measurement of wealth includes only those preferences having monetary values? Good
questions all. Yet, all admit of affirmative answers.
38
Consider the Parable of the Talents: A master entrusted assets to three servants. Two
invested the assets in productive uses, doubling their value, and were rewarded when the master
returned. The third, however, simply returned the master's assets without having earned even
interest on them and was punished.39 While Christ used this parable to make a theological point,
like all of his parables its religious significance depended upon the illustration's secular
35 Id. at 684. The legal context is complicated by the business judgment rule, which apparently grants directors the
discretion to make trade-offs between nonshareholder and shareholder interests. Properly understood, however, the
case law does not stand for that proposition. Instead, the cases stand for the proposition that courts will abstain from
reviewing the exercise of directorial discretion even when the complainant alleges that directors took
nonshareholder nterests into account in making their decision. See infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text
(discussing the relationship of the business judgment rule to the norm of shareholder wealth maximization); see
generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 971
(1992) (same).
To be sure, a few cases suggest that directors need not treat shareholder wealth maximization as their sole normative
objective. Upon close examination, however, most of these cases are not inconsistent with Dodge. In A.P. Smith
Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953), for eimple, the New Jersey supreme court validated
corporate charitable giving on the ground, inter alia, that "modern conditions require that corporations acknowledge
and discharge social as well as private responsibilities as members of the communities within which they operate."
Id. at 586. The rhetorical difference between Barlow and Dodge, however, has only symbolic import. Shareholders'
long-run interests are often served by decisions, such as charitable giving, that appear to be harmful in the short-run.
In Barlow, 98 A.2d at 586, for example, the court recognized that such arguments justified the challenged
contribution, arguably rendering its broader language on corporate social responsibility mere dictum.
As for the so-called nonshareholder constituency statutes, which appear to be inconsistent with the traditional view
espoused by Dodge and its ilk, see infra note 86.
36 1 TIMOTHY 6:10 (NAB).
37 LUKE 16:13 (NIV).
38 See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Law and Economics: An Apologia, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL
THOUGHT 208 (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001) (discussing and defending the economic principle of wealth
maximization).
39 MATTHEW 25:14-30. A somewhat different version of the parable, perhaps taught on a different occasion, appears
in LUKE 19:11-27.
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validity. 40 Here, the parable was (and remains) effective because its hearers already understood
the importance of faithfulness and fruitful obedience on the part of stewards.
Catholicism still understands that it is important for faithful stewards to vigorously
pursue the profit of their masters. The Catechism explains that profits "make possible the
investments that ensure the future of a business and they guarantee employment." 41 Pope John
Paul II's encyclical Centesimus Annus likewise recognized a legitimate "role of profit," albeit
merely "as an indicator that a business is functioning well."42
In contrast, the BISHOPS' LETTER requires stewards (here directors) to be faithful to
interests other than merely those of their masters (here shareholders).43 The Bishops assert that a
board of directors' decisions affect a much broader class of constituency groups than merely
their shareholders. 44 Employees, managers, customers, creditors, suppliers, and communities all
contribute to the enterprise, all have a stake in its success, and all are affected by its actions.
45
Hence, their interests must be reflected in the corporate decisionmaking process. To be sure, the
Bishops aknowledged the directors' and officers' legal obligation to maximize shareholder
wealth.46 They argued, however, that "morally this legal iesponsibility may be exercised only
within the bounds of justice to employees, customers, suppliers, and the local community." 47 In
other words, corporate decisionmakers have a moral obligation to balance a decision's impact on
stakeholders against its economic impact on shareholders.
The BISHOPS' LETTER, of course, is but one thread in the rich tapestry of Catholic social
thought. The most authoritative statements of the social tradition, moreover, are found in the
40 "The parables of Jesus are stories that are true to life" and "are never removed from reality." Rather, "[t]hey are
stories taken from the world in which Jesus lived and are told for the purpose of relating a spiritual truth." Simon J.
Kistemaker, Parables in EVANGELICAL DICTIONARY OF THEOLOGY 824 (Walter A. Elwell ed., 1984).
41 CATECHISM, supra note 9, at 2432.
42 Centesimus Annus, supra note 13, at 43.
43 The traditional conception in which directors are stewards of shareholder interests depends upon the corporation
being a thing capable of being owned. In the nexus of the contracts model that prevails in the law and economics
community, however, shareholders do not own the corporation. Indeed, the corporation is not a thing capable of
being owned, but rather simply the nexus of a set of contracts between factors of production. See infra notes 65-66.
Hence, the master-servant relationship of the Parable of the Talents is somewhat inapt as an analogy for the
relationship of directors and shareholders. As I have argued elsewhere, the corporation is properly viewed as a
vehicle by which directors hire factors of production, including equity capital, rather than as a vehicle by which
shareholders employ stewards. Indeed, directors are more akin to Platonic guardians than to stewards. See
Bainbridge, supra note 4. For an argument that the shareholder wealth maximization norm nevertheless can be
squared with the contractarian account, see id.
44 See BISHOPS' LETTER, supra note 7, at 298.
45 As examples, the Bishops offer plant closings and corporate takeovers, both of which have substantial affects on
those groups. See id. at 303, 305.
46 See id. at 305.
47 Id. The Bishops also proposed several institutional changes to corporate governance designed to promote
stakeholder participation in firm decisionmaking. For example, they urged greater use of worker ownership and
worker determinism. Id. at 300. They also urged labor unions to explore new relationships with management. Id. at
304. For a critique of such proposals, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Decisionmaking and the Moral
Rights of Employees: Participatory Management and Natural Law, 43 VILL. L. REV. 741 (1998).
8
Villanova Journal of Law and Investment Management, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vjlim/vol4/iss1/2
series of papal social encyclicals beginning with Pope Leo XIII's Rerum Novarum and including
Pope John Paul II's very important post-BISHOPS' LETTER encyclicals Laborem Exercens and
Centesimus Annus.4 8 John Paul II's encyclicals temper much of what was said in the BISHOPS'
LETTER.49 Yet, at least insofar as the present issue is concerned, the BISHOPS' LETTER was not
too far out of step with the mainstream of Catholic social thought. As the recently revised
Catechism explains, for example: "Those responsible for business enterprises are responsible to
society for the economic and ecological effects of their operations. They have an obligation to
consider the good of persons and not only the increase of profits.,50
C. TuE B ISHOPS' NORMATIVE ARGUMENT
The BISHOPS' LETTER posits two principal justifications for the Bishops' position. First,
the pastoral letter relies heavily on the principle of economic democracy. Second, the BISHOPS'
LETTER relies on a communitarian conception of work and the corporation. In my judgment,
neither provides a very convincing policy justification for their position.
1. Economic democracy. According to the Bishops, economic justice requires that all
corporate constituents participate in firm decisions. 51 Consequently, they called for a "new
experiment in bringing democratic ideals to economic life."' 52 But this attempt to transfer
political ideals into the corporation fails both descriptively and prescriptively.
A corporation is not a New England Town meeting. 53 Rather, it is one of the most
hierarchical of our social institutions. 54 Its sole democratic aspect is the shareholders' right to
elect directors and vote on a handful of other decisions. 55 And, of course, among all corporate
constituencies, only shareholders possess even those limited voting rights.
48 For an extensive history of Catholic social thought as expressed in the relevant series of papal encyclicals and
their antecedents, see NOVAK, supra note 6, at 61-164.
49 See supra note 13.
50 CATECHISM, supra note 9, at 2432.
51 See BISHOPS' LETTER, supra note 7, at 303.
52 Id. at 298.
53 See In re TW Services, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, [1989 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,334 at
92,180 n.14 (Del. Ch. 1989).
54 See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., ThE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN
BUSINESS 8 (1977) (noting that, over time, corporate hierarchies have proven to possess "a permanence beyond that of
any individual or group of individuals who worked in them"); PETER F. DRUCKER, CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION
141 (rev. ed., bhn Day Co. 1972) (1946) (contending that "the corporation must be organized on hierarchical
lines"); see also infra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing economic benefits to the corporation of
hierarchical organization).
55 Under the Delaware code, for example, shareholder voting rights are essentially limited to the election of directors
and approval of charter or bylaw amendments, mergers, sales of substantially all of the corporation's assets, and
voluntary dissolution. See MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 174-77 (1995)
(summarizing state corporate law on shareholder voting entitlements). As a formal matter, only the election of
directors and amending the bylaws do not require board approval before shareholder action is possible. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109, 211 (2000). In practice, of course, even the election of directors (absent a proxy contest) is
predetermined by the existing board nominating the next year's board. See generally Bayless Manning, Book
Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477, 1485-89 (1958) (describing incumbent control of the proxy voting machinery).
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The absence of economic democracy within the corporation, however, should not be a
matter of normative concern. 56 Democracy is a powerful rhetorical device, and one of which the
Bishops make frequent use, but the rhetoric of democracy provides no compelling reason to
reject hierarchical decisionmaking in corporations. That we live in a democracy does not require
us to convert all of our social institutions into democracies. Democratic societies tolerate a host
of hierarchical institutions, not least of which the Catholic Church. Nor does human dignity,
another principle invoked by the Bishops, require that all nonshareholder constituents participate
in firm decisionmaking. 57 As I have argued elsewhere in more detail, human dignity and
hierarchy are not incompatible.
58
In fact, hierarchy offers corporations affirmative benefits. 59 In a sense, management is
simply information processing. For effective management, those with the power to make
decisions must have the necessary information, which must not be distorted by others' subjective
interpretations, but at the same time the decisionmakers must not be overloaded with
unnecessary, distracting information. Branching hierarchies put people into small groups, each
member of which reports information to the same supervisor. That supervisor is likewise a
member of a small group that reports to a superior and so on up to the top. Such an
organizational system gets reliable information to the right decisionmaker more efficiently than
any other organizational system. Therefore, not surprisingly, some form of branching hierarchy
tends to be found in most public corporations: they could not make decisions without it.
2. Communitarianism. As noted above, notions of economic community provide the
second normative justification offered on behalf of the Bishops' policy recommendations in this
area.
a. The Traditional Ownership-based Theory of the Firm. As the public corporation
traditionally was conceived, the firm was not a community but rather a species of private
property. Shareholders own the company according to this view. Directors are fiduciaries
employed by the shareholders to conduct the business on their behalf. If a board decision protects
stakeholder interests by harming those of shareholders, the directors are quite literally stealing
from the shareholders:
In a free enterprise, private property system, a corporate executive is an employee of the
owners of the business. He has a direct responsibility to his employers. That
responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which generally
will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of
society.... Insofar as his actions in accord with his "social responsibility" reduce returns
to stockholders, he is spending their money. 6
56 See generally Bainbridge, supra note 47, at 804-11 (discussing the use of workplace democracy arguments in
Catholic social teaching).
57 See id. at 785 (arguing that "human dignity is an indeterminate concept requiring greater specification and
assessment").
58 See generally id. at 784-828 (discussing the relationship between hierarchy and human dignity).
59 See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management: An Organizational Failures
Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 1004-09 (1998) (discussing the economics of hierarchy).
60 Friedman, supra note 5.
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Because private property is such a profound part of the American ethos, this model's ethical
implications have strongly influenced U.S. courts and lawmakers. The corporation is a thing, so
it can be owned. The shareholders own the corporation, so directors are merely stewards of their
interests. As the Parable of the Talents teaches, stewards are called to faithful service. In
particular, as Christ observed in the Sermon on the Mount: "No servant can serve two masters."
' 62
This observation seems just as valid in economic as in religious life. If so, we cannot expect
directors to be simultaneously loyal to the interests of both shareholders and stakeholders. Where
those interests conflict, the directors' role as stewards requires them to prefer the interests of
their shareholder masters. 
63
This model, however, depends upon the corporation being a thing capable of being
owned. It requires one to reify the corporation: to treat the firm as an entity separate from its
various constituents. While reification provides a necessary semantic shorthand, taken to
extremes it creates a sort of false consciousness. 64 The corporation is not a thing. It is a legal
fiction representing the nexus of the set of contracts among multiple factors of production (a.k.a.
corporate constituencies).
b. Contracts and Communities. Hence, when economists (and economically minded legal
scholars) look at the corporation, they see a web of contracts. 65 The Bishops looked at the same
firm and saw a community of shared interests. The economist sees inputs whose team labor
produces outputs. 66 Similarly, the Bishops see workers, creditors, managers, shareholders, and
61 Cf Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988) (opining: "The theory of our
corporation law confers power upon directors as the agents of the shareholders...").
62 MATTHEW 6:24 (NAB). I acknowledge the irony that the masters of which Christ was speaking at the time were
God and money. See id. (stating that one "cannot serve God and mammon").
63 Cf Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (holding that a corporation's board is obliged to
maximize shareholder interests, even if doing so is adverse to the interests of debenture holders).
64 On the uses and misuses of reification, see WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 108-09 (7th ed. 2000).
65 See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 18 (1996) (describing the firm as "a nexus of
contracts," by which he means that the "firm is in essence the common signatory of a group of contracts" among
various factors of production). This model's origins fairly can be traced to Nobel Prize laureate Ronald Coase's justly
famous article on the nature of the firm. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (N.S.) 386 (1937). As
no less an authority than former Delaware Chancellor William Allen has acknowledged, contractarianism is now the
"dominant legal academic view." William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1395, 1400 (1993). Contractarianism nevertheless still has critics, including some very distinguished ones. See,
e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403
(1985); Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. W V.
1703 (1989); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (1989). For a
defense of contractarian theory, see Fred S. McChesney, Economics, Law, and Science in the Corporate Field: A
Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1530 (1989).
66 Building on Coase's work, modern law and economics scholars view the corporation not as an entity but as an
aggregate of various inputs acting together to produce goods or services. Employees provide labor. Creditors provide
debt capital. Shareholders initially provide equity capital and subsequently bear the risk of losses and monitor the
performance of management. Management monitors the performance of employees and coordinates the activities of all
the firm's inputs. The firm is the nexus of explicit and implicit contracts establishing rights and obligations among the
various inputs making up the firm. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989); Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 318-
28 (1993).
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the local communities in which the firm does business as all making a contribution to the firm's
success and all having a stake in the enterprise. 67 The economist sees the directors as
coordinating the activities of the other inputs. The Bishops see the directors as the leaders of the
community. 68 The economist sees corporate takeovers as a potential breach of implied contracts
between the sharelulders and the various other inputs. 69 The Bishops see them as potential
breaches of faith. 70
At first blush, it may seem that the two are using different language to describe the same
phenomenon. On closer examination, however, the Bishops and the economists are talking about
two very different things. The economists' contractual understanding of the firm is not
communitarian in nature. To the contrary, a common criticism of the contractual model is its
incompatibility with the communitarian vision. 71 As I have explained elsewhere, the
contractarian model is perfectly compatible with an understanding of the corporation as a
command- and- control hierarchy. 72
c. The Inaptitude of Comm unitarianism. According to the Bishops, a community is
characterized by reciprocal responsibility. 73 The Bishops noted, for example, that Israel was
commanded to protect those members of the community who were vulnerable to oppression or
poverty: widows, orphans, debtors, strangers, and slaves. 74 They also point out that, in response
to Christ's command that we love our neighbors as ourselves, 75 the early church developed
institutional mechanisms to care for those members of their communities who were in need.76
Drawing on these examples, the Bishops argue that the members of the corporate community
67 See BISHOPS' LETTER, supra note 7, at 298.
68 See Shaffer, supra note 8, at 329-30. Invocations of the corporation's purported communal character are not
uncommon in the business literature. Famed managerialist Peter Drucker, for examples, argues that "the corporation
must be organized on hierarchical lines," but at the same time posits that subordinates are just as important to the
enterprise's success as their superiors. DRUCKER, supra note 54, at 141. Moreover, he explicitly treats the industrial
plant as a "plant community," which not only produces goods, but also should provide essential services to the
members of the community. Id. at 191-99.
69 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV.
1 (1986); Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988); but see GREGG, supra note 30, at 42-43
(criticizing this view).
70 See BISHOPS' LETTER, supra note 7, at 305.
71 See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 185, 187 (Lawrence
E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (criticizing the "increasing hegemony of contract as the governing model in corporate law");
see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive
Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 873-900 (1997) (criticizing left-communitarian theories of
the firm).
72 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 653-64
(1996).
73 See BISHOPS' lETTER, supra note 7, at 36.
74 See id.; see, e.g., EXODUS 22:21-26; DEUTERONOMY 15:7-18; JEREMIAH 34:8-18.
75 MARK 12:31.
76 See BISHOPS' LETTER, supra note 7, at 5 1 -52.
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have reciprocal moral duties to one another. At the heart of those moral duties is an obligation to
treat each member of the community fairly and to respect each member's human dignity. 
77
Communitarian models of the corporation, however, strain credulity past the breaking
point. 78 Roberta Romano aptly observed the inherent linkages between communitarian models
and New Left ideology. 79 Romano explained that this vision is essentially inconsistent with large
public corporations:
Adherents of this vision maintain that the decentralization of corporate organizations,
involving direct participation in firm decisionmaking by all members, is a prerequisite for
establishing fully participatory political structures. For a decentralized communitarian
system to work, societal units, being predicated on the economic and political equality of
their members, must possess attributes of smallness and sameness.80
The public corporation lacks those key attributes. As a left-liberal critic of the communitarian
model explained, citing the Bhopal disaster as an example of the problem, communitarians posit
that "the retired teacher in California who has invested in Union Carbide through participation in
[CalPERS], the factory worker in Pennsylvania, and the relatives of a dead peasant in central
India all belong to a single community characterized by ties of mutual interdependence and a
history of cooperative activity." 81 Instead of a community of shared values, a large corporation in
fact resembles the nanny state-a large, impersonal bureaucracy better equipped to terrorize than
to nurture. As Romano observed, "[communal] characteristics cannot survive within large
hierarchical corporations, whose dynamics undermine and destabilize the egalitarian basis of
social relationships."
' 82
77 See BISHOPS' LETTER, supra note 7, at 69; Manuel G. Velasquez, Ethics, Religion and the Modern Business
Corporation, in THE CATHOLIC CHALLENGE TO THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: REFLECTIONS ON THE U.S. BSHOPS'
PASTORAL LETTER ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE U.S. RONOMY 55, 59-60 (Thomas M. Gannon, S.J.,
ed., 1987).
78 See David Millon, Personifying the Corporate Body, 2 GRAVEN IMAGES 116, 127 (1995). To be sure, Catholic
neoconservative Michael Novak puts a strongly communitarian gloss on his understanding of the business
corporation. See, e.g., NOVAK, supra note 11, at 29; see also GREGG, supra note 30, at 56-57. As we shall see below,
communal visions of the corporation become more plausible if we treat the corporation not as a single community,
but as a collection of many smaller communities. See infra note 82.
79 Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 948 (1984).
80 Id. See also infra notes 125-145 and accompanying text (noting and criticizing statist implications of the Bishops'
proposals in this area).
81 Millon, supra note 78, at 127.
82 Romano, supra note 79, at 948. To be sure, the corporation may harbor within it sub-groups that amount to
communities of shared values. The emergence of such sub-group communities is especially likely among those who
work for the corporation:
In the economic sphere today sociality seems far more prevalent than individualism. In democratic
capitalist nations various social organisms, including the business enterprise and the corporation, have
replaced or supplemented old loyalties to family and clan. Some persons today are closer to their colleagues
in the workplace than to their family.
NOVAK, supra note 11, at 29. One's co-workers thus provide precisely the cloud of witnesses so essential to the
inculcation of virtue. Indeed, one might even argue that communities existing within the corporation help promote
religious virtue: "For many millions of religious persons the daily milieu in which they work out their salvation is
the communal, corporate world of the workplace." Id. at 47.
PAGE 1 5 VOLUME 4, ISSUE I
13
Bainbridge: The Bishops and the Corporate Stakeholder Debate
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
VILLANOVA JOURNAL OF LAW AND
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT PAGE 16
Even if we conceded that the corporation is a community, moreover, that community
would still face tragic choices. Moral considerations affect hard economic decisions, but cannot
eliminate them. Obsolete plants must be closed, even if workers must be laid off. Adverse market
conditions may necessitate cuts in pay and/or dividends. To their credit, the Bishops do not ask
directors to duck these hard decisions. They do, however, assert that directors, as the corporate
community's leaders, must mediate the competing demands of their constituents. 83 Shareholders
benefited from the efforts of the firm's employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, and the
communities in which the corporation operated.84 Shareholder interests alone therefore cannot
control. Instead, while directors need not avoid a painful decision, they must consider the
decision's impact on everyone who serves the corporation and must strive to minimize its
deleterious effects. 85 But why? And even if the leaders of a community have a moral obligation
to balance the interests of every stakeholder in that community when making decisions, should
we translate that obligation into the positive law?
II. PRUDENCE AND THE THORNY PROBLEM OF IMPLEMENTATION
Suppose society is persuaded by the Bishops. How then would we proceed to
operationalize their recommendations? Unfortunately, the Bishops did not address this question,
apparently choosing to leave it to policy wonks. In any case, three options suggest themselves.
First, we could give directors nonreviewable discretion to make trade-offs between shareholder
and stakeholder interests. Second, we could give directors discretion to make such trade-offs
subject to some form of judicial review. 86 Finally, we could mandate that directors make such
To concede Novak's argument for the existence of workplace communities, of course, does not necessitate that we
also accept the Bishops' argument for legal change designed to promote their utopian vision of industrial relations.
To the contrary, if the corporation harbors within it communities that inculcate virtue in the firm's workers, state
interference with the corporation's internal governance becomes indistinguishable from, and hence no less tolerable
than, state interference with any other virtue-inculcating institution. Most people belong to a host of communities
with the potential to inculcate virtue and other communal values: churches, schools, fraternal organizations, and the
like. While it may be unrealistic to think of a large multinational corporation as constituting such a community, it is
perfectly plausible to think of the corporation as an intermediary institution standing between the individual and
Leviathan. In other words, while virtuous citizens are developed by smaller institutions with roots in the local
community, the corporation still can act as a vital countervailing force against the state. Resistance to expanding the
realm of mandatory corporate law rules thus responds to the "notion that the prevailing moral threat in our era may
not be the power of the corporations, but the growing power and irresponsibility of the state." Id. at 34.
83 Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout have recently advanced what they call a "team production" model of the
corporation, which they assert provides an economic rationale for drectors to serve as so-called "mediating
hierarchs." See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L.
REV. 247 (1999); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Team Production in Business Organizations: An
Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 743 (1999). For a response and critique of the mediating hierarch model, see
Bainbridge, supra note 4.
84 See BISHOPS' LETTER, supra note 7, at 305.
85 See id.
86 Some might argue that the Bishops' position already has been operationalized by the so-called nonshareholder
constituency statutes adopted by many states (although not Delaware). These statutes give directors discretion
(presumably reviewable) to consider the interests of such constituencies when making decisions. Consequently,
some scholars argue that these call into question the continuing validity of the shareholder wealth maximization
norm. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, supra note 83, at 303 n.144; Kent
Greenfield & John E. Nilsson, Gradgrind's Education: Using Dickens and Aristotle to Understand (and Replace?)
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trade-offs subject to judicial review and/or regulatory oversight. Each of these options, however,
would leave us worse off than current law.
A. OPTION A: NONREVIEWABLE DISCRETION
It is difficult to think of any socially significant decisionmaker to whom the law gives
nonreviewable discretion. 87 Yet, as a thought experiment, suppose society gave corporate boards
of directors the nonreviewable power to consider interests other than shareholder wealth
maximization when making decisions. How would boards respond?
An obvious answer is suggested by agency cost economics; namely, the risk of self-
dealing. Agency cost economics predicts that directors will not mediate between competing
constituencies, but rather use nonshareholder interests to justify decisions that in fact advance
their own self-interest. In my view, this is a legitimate concern and, indeed, the strongest
objection to the Bishops' proposal. Because a system in which directors are granted reviewable
discretion presents the same concern, however, consideration of it may be deferred to the next
section.
Hence, suffice it here to suggest that implementing a toothless regime of nonreviewable
discretion is unlikely to effect a near-term change in director behavior. Although some scholars
claim that directors do not adhere to the shareholder wealth maximization norm,8 8 the weight of
the evidence is to the contrary. A 1995 National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD)
report stated: "The primary objective of the corporation is to conduct business activities with a
view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain." 89 A 1996 NACD report on director
professionalism set out the same objective, without any qualifying language on nonshareholder
constituencies. A 1999 Conference Board survey found that directors of U.S. corporations
generally define their role as running the company for the benefit of its shareholders. 9' The 2000
the Business Judgment Rule, 63 BROOKLYN L. REV. 799, 838-39 (1997). As I have argued elsewhere, however,
these statutes do not entirely reject the traditional shareholder wealth maximization norm. Instead, they modify the
norm by allowing the board to make trade-offs between shareholder and stakeholder interests. See Bainbridge, supra
note 35, at 989-96. As such, the statutes admittedly work an unfortunate change in the basic normative principles
underlying corporate law. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A
Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1423-24 n.2 (1993). Fortunately, courts seem to be
ignoring these statutes and, at present, they appear to be little more than dust gathering relics of the 1980s wave of
state antitakeover legislation. See id. (noting the "dearth of cases"). The nonshareholder constituency statutes were
just another exa mple of special interest legislation adopted at the behest of union leaders and managers of target
corporations to protect important local businesses from takeovers. Bainbridge, supra note 35, at 993.
87 Cf MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 268 (1994) (opining that "the heavy machinery of law is
being wheeled out to deal with a growing array of personal, economic, and political matters").
88 See, e.g., Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, supra note 83, at 286.
89 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS, REPORT OF THE NACD BUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON
DIRECTOR COMPENSATION: PURPOSES, PRINCIPLES, AND BEST PRACTICES 1 (1995) (noting that "long-term
shareholder gain" requires "fair treatment" of nonshareholder constituents).
90 See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS, REPORT OF THE NACD BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON
DIRECTOR PROFESSIONALISM 1 (1996).
91 THE CONFERENCE BOARD, DETERMINING BOARD EFFECTIVENESS: A HANDBOOK FOR DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS 7
(1999).
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edition of Korn/Ferry International's well-known director survey found that when making
corporate decisions directors consider shareholder interests nrst frequently, although it also
found that a substantial number of directors feel a responsibility towards stakeholders. 
92
What people do arguably matters more than what they say. Director fidelity to
shareholder interests has been enhanced in recent years by the market for corporate control and,
some say, activism by institutional investors. Hence, for example, the widespread corporate
restructurings of the 1990s are commonly attributed to director concern for shareholder wealth
maximization. 93 In addition, changes in director compensation have created additional hostages
ensuring director fidelity to shareholder interests. 94 Directors have long given shareholders
reputational hostages. If the company fails on their watch, after all, the directors' reputation and
thus their future employability is likely to suffer. 95 In addition, it is becoming common to
compensate outside directors in stock rather than cash and to establish minimum stock ownership
requirements as a qualification for election. 96 Tying up the proportion of the director's personal
wealth in stock of the corporation creates another hostage, further aligning the director's interests
with those of shareholders. 
97
None of this is to say that directors are wholly faithful to shareholder interests. Evidence
abounds that when directors have conflicted interests they sometimes (often?) pursue their self-
interest in preference to the interests of either shareholders or any other corporate constituency.
My point here is only that, as between shareholder and nonshareholder interests, directors are
strongly socialized to put the former first.
B. OPTION B: REVIEWABLE DISCRETION
Despite the powerful rhetoric of cases like Dodge, current law in fact allows boards of
directors substantial discretion to consider the impact of their decisions on interests other than
shareholder wealth maximization. This discretion, however, exists not as the outcome of
conscious social policy, but rather as an unintended consequence of the business judgment rule. 98
92 KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL, 2 7TH ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 33-34 (2000).
93 See, e.g., MICHAEL USEEM, INVESTOR CAPITALISM: IDW MONEY MANAGERS ARE CHANGING THE FACE OF
CORPORATE AMERICA 137-67 (1996) (discussing corporate restructurings as a consequence of investor pressure).
94 Hostages -reciprocal transaction-specific investments-are a central concept in institutional economics. Giving
and taking hostages is a mechanism for making credible commitments. I'll pay the ransom, because I know that you
will kill the hostage if I do not. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, TIE- MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 75-78, 124-29
(1996) (discussing the hostage model of contracting).
95 Cf Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 301, 315
(1983) (opining that "outside directors will monitor the management that chooses them because outside directors
have incentives to develop reputations as experts in decision control").
96 See generally Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 649
(1995) (discussing stock-based director compensation and incentives created thereby).
97 See Outside Directors: The Fading Appeal of the Boardroom, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 20, 2001, at 67, 69 (relating
an anecdote in which one outside director who owned $500,000 worth of corporate stock stated: "If this company
faces a challenge, I lose sleep at night").
98 The business judgment rule, of course, pervades every aspect of corporate law, from allegedly negligent decisions
by directors, to self-dealing transactions, to board decisions to seek dismissal of shareholder litigation, and so on.
See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (discussing fiduciary duties of controlling
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To be sure, some scholars find an inconsistency between the business judgment rule and the
shareholder wealth maximization norm. 99 I concede that the business judgment rule sometimes
has the effect of insulating a board of directors from liability when it puts the interests of
nonshareholder constituencies ahead of shareholder interests, but deny that that is the rule's
intent.100 Instead, as the Delaware Supreme Court has explained:
Under Delaware law, the business judgment rule is the offspring of the fundamental
principle, codified in [Delaware General Corporation Law] § 141(a), the business and
affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by or under its board of directors.... The
business judgment rule exists to protect and promote the full and free exercise of the
managerial power granted to Delaware directors.' 0'
shareholder); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. 1968) (operational decision); Auerbach v. Bennett,
393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979) (dismissal of derivative litigation). Two conceptions of the business judgment rule
compete in the case law. One treats the rule as having substantive content. In this version, the business judgment
rule comes into play only after one has first determined that the directors satisfied some standard of conduct. See,
e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) (holding that plaintiffs rebut the business
judgment rule's presumption of good faith by "providing evidence that directors, in reaching their challenged
decision, breached any one of the triads of their fiduciary duty-good faith, loyalty or due care"). Alternatively, the
business judgment rule is seen as an abstention doctrine. Under this version, the court will abstain from reviewing
the substantive merits of the directors' conduct unless the plaintiff can rebut the business judgment rule's
presumption of good faith. See, e.g., Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 779 (holding that "In a purely business corporation...
the authority of the directors in the conduct of the business of the corporation must be regarded as absolute when
they act within the law, and the court is without authority to substitute its judgment for that of the directors."). For
the reasons developed below, I find the abstention version more persuasive. See infra notes 102-106 and
accompanying text.
99 See Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, supra note 83, at 303 (arguing that the business
judgment rule authorizes directors to make trade-offs between shareholder and nonshareholder interests); Greenfield
and Nilsson, supra note 86, at 831 (arguing that the business judgment rule reflects "an underlying distrust of the
strict fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder returns"); see also D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm,
23 J. CORP. L. 277, 286-87 (1998) (noting that the business judgment rule precludes liability where directors fail to
maximize shareholder wealth). In her comments on my paper, Professor Margaret Blair took issue with my
interpretation of the relevant precedents. For an argument that Blair has misinterpreted the law in this area, however,
see David Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of Corporate
Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1009-20 (2000); see also Bainbridge, supra note 4.
100 To be sure, a few cases can be read to suggest that directors need not treat shareholder wealth maximization as
their sole normative objective. Upon close examination, however, most of these cases, in fact, are not inconsistent
with the shareholder wealth maximization norm. See supra note 35 (discussing such cases). In Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d
776, for example, a minority shareholder in the Chicago Cubs sued Wrigley, the team's majority shareholder, over
the latter's famous refusal to install lights at Wrigley Field. Shlensky claimed the decision against lights was
motivated by Wrigley's beliefs that baseball was a day-time sport and that night baseball might have a deteriorating
effect on the neighborhood surrounding Wrigley Field. Id. at 778. Despite Shlensky's apparently uncontested
evidence that Wrigley was more concerned with nonshareholder than with shareholder interests, the Illinois
Appellate Court dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id. at 778-80. Although on
superficial examination this result may appear to devalue shareholder wealth maximization, on close examination
the case hvolves nothing more than a wholly unproblematic application of the business judgment rule. See
Bainbridge, supra note 35, at 978-79 (discussing Shlensky).
101 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). Cf Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 (N.Y. 1996)
(noting that "shareholder derivative actions infringe upon the managerial discretion of corporate boards ...
Consequently, we have historically been reluctant to permit shareholder derivative suits, noting that the power of
courts to direct the management of a corporation's affairs should be 'exercised with restraint."'); see also Pogostin v.
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The business judgment rule thus operationalizes the intuition that fiat- i.e., centralization of
decisionmaking authority-is the essential attribute of efficient corporate governance. °2 As
Nobel laureate economist Kenneth Arrow explains, however, authority and accountability cannot
be reconciled:
[Accountability mechanisms] must be capable of correcting errors but should not be such
as to destroy the genuine values of authority. Clearly, a sufficiently strict and continuous
organ of [accountability] can easily amount to a denial of authority. If every decision of
A is to be reviewed by B, then all we have really is a shift in the locus of authority from
A to B and hence no solution to the original problem.' 03
The business judgment rule prevents such a shift in the locus of decisio nmaking authority from
boards to judges. It does so by establishing a limited system for case-by-case oversight in which
judicial review of the substantive merits of those decisions is avoided. The court begins with a
presumption against review. 104 It then reviews the facts to determine not the quality of the
decision, but rather whether the decisionmaking process was tainted by self-dealing and the
like. 105 The questions asked are objective and straightforward: Did the board commit fraud? Did
the board commit an illegal act? Did the board self-deal? Whether or not the board exercised
reasonable care is irrelevant, as well it should be. 106 The business judgment rule thus erects a
prophylactic barrier by which courts pre-commit to resisting the temptation to review the merits
of the board's decision.
The business judgment rule, however, has no application where the board of directors is
disabled by conflicted interests. 10 7 In such cases, concern for director accountability trumps
protection of their discretionary authority. In corporate takeovers, for example, a well-known
conflict of interests taints target company director decisionmaking. 108 Not surprisingly, therefore,
Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984) (noting that "the derivative action impinges on the managerial freedom of
directors").
102 See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2002).
103 KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANZATION 78 (1974).
104 See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (explaining that the rule creates a presumption that
the directors or officers of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company).
105 See, e.g., Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (N.Y. Sup. 1976) (stating that absent "fraud,
dishonesty, or nonfeasance," the court would not substitute its judgment for that of the directors).
106 See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) ("While it is often stated that corporate directors and
officers will be liable for negligence in carrying out their corporate duties, all seem agreed that such a statement is
misleading .... Whatever the terminology, the fact is that liability is rarely imposed upon corporate directors or
officers simply for bad judgment and this reluctance to impose liability for unsuccessful business decisions has been
doctrinally labeled the business judgment rule."); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 262-64 (Del. 2000) (rejecting
plaintiffs contention that the business judgment rule includes an element of "substantive due care" and holding that
the business judgment rule requires only "process due care").
107 See Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (N.Y. Sup. 1944) (explaining: "The 'business judgment rule' ... yields to
the rule of undivided loyalty. This great rule of law is designed 'to avoid the possibility of fraud and to avoid the
temptation of self-interest."').
108 Shareholders unquestionably benefit from a successful takeover. Successful bids produce positive abnormal
returns for targets ranging from 16.9 percent to 34.1 percent, with a weighted average of 29.1 percent. Moreover,
target shareholders appear to capture most of the gains, as abnormal positive returns to bidding firms range from 2.4
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the law denies directors the discretion ID consider the interests of nonshareholder constituencies
in the takeover setting. 109 To be sure, the interests of shareholders and nonshareholder may be
consistent in takeover fights, just as they are in many settings. In light of the directors' conflict of
interests, however, we can no longer trust them to make an unbiased assessment of those
competing interests. The conflict between management and shareholder interests requires
skepticism when management claims to be acting in the stakeholders' best interests. A board
decision to resist a hostile offer may have been motivated by concern for potentially affected
nonshareholder constituencies, but it may just as easily have been motivated by the directors'
and managers' concern for their own positions and perquisites. Selfish decisions, therefore,
easily could be justified by an appropriate paper trail of tears over the employees' fate.
Consequently, in the takeover setting, rigorous application of the shareholder wealth
maximization norm properly becomes the standard of judicial review.
This then is the major failing of the Bishops' support for a multi-constituency conception
of corporate directors' duties. "Any social order that intends to endure must be based on a certain
realism about human beings and, therefore, on a theory of sin and a praxis for dealing with it." 
110
Here, the sin in question is that of self-interest. While the Bishops' proposal would empower
honest directors to act in the best interests of all the corporation's constituents, it also would
empower dishonest directors to pursue their own self-interest. There is a very real risk that
directors and managers given discretion to consider interests other than shareholder wealth
maximization will use stakeholder interests as a cloak for actions taken to advance their own
selfish interests.
This flaw in the Bishops' analysis is surprising, to say the least. Christianity is not a
utopian faith-rather it is quite realistic about human beings. In particular, the central doctrine of
the Fall of Man tells a coherent story about the nature and origins of human preferences in an
unredeemed world. To be sure, Christians are called to a higher standard of behavior than that of
fallen Man. In making social policy, we must remember that all have sinned. '' Consider again
percent to 6.7 percent, with a weighted average of 3.8 percent. If a hostile takeover bid fails because of management
resistance, the consequences to target company shareholders are thus quite severe. In addition, all shareholders
indirectly benefit from takeovers because the disciplining effect of hostile takeovers encourages all corporate
managers-not just those fighting off a takeover bid-to maximize shareholder wealth. See Frank A. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 BUS. LAW. 1733 (1981); Frank
A. Easterbrook & Gregg A. Jarrell, Do Targets Gain From Defeating Tender Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277
(1984); Gregg A. Jarrell et al., The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. Econ.
Persp. 49 (1988); Michael Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence,
1 I J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983). In contrast, incumbent target managers are the one group unarguably harmed by hostile
takeovers. In today's hostile takeover environment, target directors and officers know that a successful bidder is
likely to fire many of them. Kenneth J. Martin & John J. McConnell, Corporate Performance, Corporate Takeovers,
and Management Turnover, 46 J. FIN. 671 (1991).
109 Under the Delaware supreme court's decision in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., a target's
board of directors may not protect stakeholder interests at the expense of shareholder interests. 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986). Rather, any management action benefiting stakeholders must produce ancillary shareholder benefits. Id.
In addition, once an auction of corporate control begins, stakeholders become entirely irrelevant. In such an auction,
shareholder wealth maximization is the board's only appropriate concern. Id. Indeed, in this context, considering any
factors other than shareholder wealth violates the board's fiduciary duties. Id. at 185.
110 NOVAK, supra note 11, at 22.
ill ROMANS 6:12.
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the Parable of the Talents. The faithless steward put his own self- interest ahead of that of his
master, which is precisely what faithless directors might do. 
112
Accordingly, it is consistent with the Christian world view to insist that a realistic social
order must be designed around principles that fall short of Christian ideals. In particular, the
rules must not be defined in ways that effectively require every citizen to be a practicing
Christian. Christian visions of Justice therefore cannot determine the rules of economic order.
Instead, legal rules and predictions about human behavior must assume the fallen state of Man. 113
To be sure, judges could develop standards by which to review the fidelity of fallen
directors to multiple constituencies. As one critic of the shareholder wealth maximization norm
opines:
[F]iduciaries of various sorts commonly find themselves pulled between competing
duties .... In all these instances, professionals are expected to do the best they can by
both developing and working within a framework of reasonable and defensible priorities.
Why cannot corporate directors and senior managers be asked to do the same?
114
He then confidentially predicted that the legal profession will "develop the outlines of a
multi- fiduciary" duty after "years of painstaking legal reasoning." 115
But this is more easily said than done. With respect to the ability of directors and
managers to juggle the interests of multiple constituencies, consider the Biblical aphorism that no
one can serve two masters. 116 As with the Parable of the Talents,' 17 those of us who find this
aphorism theologically sound do so in part precisely because we recognize its validity from our
secular experience. 1 8 A familiar example of a situation in which a fiduciary is "pulled between
112 MATTHEW 25:25 (NAB) (recounting how the faithless servant acted to protect himself for fear of the master). For
further discussion of the Parable, see supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
113 See NOVAK, supra note 11, at 28 (observing that no realistic social order can assume "heroic or even consistently
virtuous behavior" by its citizens).
114 Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate Governance, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1409, 1418 (1993).
115 Id. at 1419.
116 MATTHEW 6:24.
117 In the Parable of the Talents itself, moreover, the faithless steward readily could be held responsible for his
defection precisely because the master had a determinate metric of wealth maximization. See MATTHEW 25:30
(NAB) (recounting how the faithless servant was thrown "into the darkness outside, where there will be wailing and
grinding of teeth").
118 Chief Justice Harlan Stone explained that the fiduciary's duty of loyalty was based on:
[T]he precept as old as Holy Writ, that "a man cannot serve two masters." More than a century ago equity
gave a hospitable reception to that principle and the common law was not slow to follow in giving it
recognition. No thinking man can believe that an economy built upon a business foundation can long
endure without loyalty to that principle. . . . The separation of ownership from management, the
development of the corporate structure so as to vest in small groups control of resources of great numbers
of small and uninformed investors, make imperative a fresh and active devotion to that principle if the
modern world of business is to perform its proper function.
Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1934).
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competing duties" is that of the "lawyer for the situation."'1 19 As anyone who has experience in
this area knows, this role is at best uncomfortable and frequently untenable. Consider the
example of Louis Brandeis, who coined the phrase:
[T]he greatest caution to be gained from study of the Brandeis record is, never be
"counsel for a situation." A lawyer is constantly confronted with conflicts which he is
frequently urged to somehow try to work out. I have never attempted this without
wishing I had not, and I have given up attempting it. Particularly when old clients are at
odds, counsel may feel the most extreme pressure to solve their problems for them. It is a
time- consuming, costly, unsuccessful mistake, which usually results in disaffecting both
sides.
120
Even authorities more favorably disposed toward the possibility of attorneys serving as lawyers
for the situation acknowledge that that role "is not easy, may fail, and will often bring
recrimination in its wake."'
121
As for the prospect of developing appropriate standards of review, the "lawyer for the
situation" example again proves disquieting. Despite many years of refinement, these rules are
still viewed as inadequate, vague, and inconsistent; 122 hardly the stuff of which certainty and
predictability are made. ' 23 Yet, despite the central importance of those virtues in corporate
law, 124 this is the sort of model we would end up with if we tried to operationalize the Bishops'
position.
In sum, absent the shareholder wealth maximization norm, both boards and ourts will
lack a determinate metric for assessing options. Instead, stakeholder decisionmaking models
inevitably lead to indeterminate results. Worse yet, such models would still lack an adequate
praxis for sin. Directors who are responsible to everyone are accountable to no one. Absent clear
standards, directors will be tempted to pursue their own self-interest. One may celebrate the
virtues of granting directors largely unfettered discretion to manage the business enterprise,
without having to ignore the agency costs associated with such discretion. Discretion should not
be allowed to camouflage self-interest.
119 See Green, supra note 114, at 1418 (invoking this situation as an example).
120 John P. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683, 708 (1965).
121 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM 1-ODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 2.2:103, at 513 (2d ed. 1990).
122 See Marc 1. Steinberg & Timothy U. Sharpe, Attorney Conflicts of Interest: The Need for a Coherent Framework,
66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2 (1990); see also Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous
Representation of Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion and Controversy, 61 TEX. L.
REv. 211 (1982).
123 Cf Joel C. Dobris, Ethical Problems for Lawyers upon Trust Terminations: Conflicts of Interest, 38 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1, 51 (1983) (observing: "When a person is unhappy about an irrevocable financial arrangement that he has
entered into with the participation of a lawyer who also represents another person who is interested in the
transaction, there is no certainty or predictability for the lawyer.").
124 See, e.g., Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 220 (Del. Ch. 1974) (opining: "It is obviously important that the
Delaware corporate law have stability and predictability.").
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C. MANDATING D IRECTOR CONSIDERATION OF NONSHAREHOLDER INTERESTS
In evaluating the final option for operationalizing the Bishops' policy preferences in this
area, I hope to be especially provocative. In my view, the Bishops' objections to the shareholder
wealth maximization norm are a specific incarnation of the broader attack launched throughout
this century against capitalism by a number of prominent Christian scholars and intellectuals-
i.e., the world view captured by Paul Tillich's claim that "any serious Christian must be a
socialist." 125
To be sure, John Paul II's encyclicals make clear that Catholicism decisively rejects
socialism in all its forms. 126 The U.S. Bishops' communitarian model, however, differs from the
statism of traditional socialist theory only in degree but not in kind. Instead of supporting direct
state regulation of corporate decisionmaking, as old-time socialists urged, the Bishops propose to
empower state-sponsored constituency groups (such as labor unions or environmentalists) to
exercise some ill-defined degree of influence in corporate decisionmaking processes. 127 The
Bishops thus bring to mind Richard Epstein's trenchant observation that even most socialists no
longer advocate direct government ownership of production: "At a personal level, [modem
socialism] speaks to the alienation of the individual, stressing the need for caring and sharing and
the politics of meaning. At a regulatory level, it seeks to identify specific sectors in which there
is a market failure and then to subject them to various forms of government regulation." 128
All of which might be less troubling if the shareholder wealth maximization norm's sole
function were to generate profits that in turn serve only, as John Paul II asserted, "as an indicator
that a business is functioning well." 1 29 The corporation's freedom to pursue wealth for its
shareholders, however, does more than just expand the economic pie for investors. A legal
system that permits pursuit of wealth maximization necessarily must allow individuals freedom
to pursue the accumulation of wealth. Economic liberty, in turn, is a necessary concomitant of
personal liberty-the two have almost always marched hand in hand. 130 The pursuit of wealth
has been a major factor in destroying arbitrary class distinctions, moreover, by enhancing
personal and social mobility. 131 At the same time, the manifest failure of socialist systems to
deliver reasonable standards of living has undermined their viability as an alternative to
democratic capitalist societies in which wealth maximization is a paramount societal goal.
125 RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, DOING WELL AND DOING GOOD 47 (1992) (quoting Tillich).
126 See, e.g., Centesimus Annus, supra note 13, at 13.
127 Notably, however, Milton Friedman criticized the BISHOPS' LETTER for finding "the answer to each and every
problem in a greater role for government and particularly for central government." Milton Friedman, Good Ends,
Bad Means in THE CATHOLIC CHALLENGE TO THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: REFLECTIONS ON THE U.S. BSHOPS'
PASTORAL LETTER ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE U.S. RONOMY 99, 100 (Thomas M. Gannon ed.,
1987).
128 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FORA COMPLEX WORLD 23 (1995).
129 Centesimus Annus, supra note 13, at 43.
130 See NOVAK, supra note 11, at 44-45.
131 See id. at 42.
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Accordingly, it seems fair to argue that the economic liberty to pursue wealth is an effective
means for achieving a variety of moral ends. 1
32
In turn, the modern public corporation has turned out to be a powerful engine for
focusing the efforts of individuals to maintain the requisite sphere of economic liberty. As
Michael Novak observes, private property and freedom of contract were "indispensable if private
business corporations were to come into existence." 133 In turn, the corporation gives "liberty
economic substance over and against the state." 
134
Those whose livelihood depends on corporate enterprise therefore (annot be neutral
about political systems. Only democratic capitalist societies permit voluntary formation of
private corporations and allot them a sphere of economic liberty within which to function, which
gives those who value such enterprises a powerful incentive to resist both statism and
socialism. 135 Because tyranny is far more likely to come from the public sector than the private,
those who for selfish reasons strive to maintain both a democratic capitalist society and, of
particular relevance to the jcesent argument, a substantial sphere of economic liberty therein
serve the public interest. 136
Concern for human freedom is wholly consistent with Catholic social teaching. As John
Paul II explained in Centesimus Annus, socialism was flawed because it maintained "that the
good of the individual can be realized without reference to his free choice, to the unique and
exclusive responsibility which he exercises in the face of good or evil.' 37 Likewise, in Gaudium
et Spes, the Second Vatican Council explicitly linked freedom and human dignity. 138
Subsidiarity is a core principle by which the Church operationalizes its concern for
human freedom. The Catechism defines subsidiarity as follows: "A community of a higher order
should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving the latter of its
functions, but rather should support it in case of need and help to coordinate its activity with the
activities of the rest of society, always with the view to the common good." 39 Hence, Pope Pius
XI explained that "it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance of right
132 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 382 (1990). Professors DeBow and Lee cogently
argue that the shareholder wealth maximization norm promotes efficient resource allocation on a society-wide basis,
which they plausibly assert redounds to the benefit of consumers-the largest nonshareholder constituency of them
all. Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Shareholders, Nonshareholders and Corporate Law: Communitarianism
and Resource Allocation, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 393, 416-18 (1993).
133 NOVAK, supra note 11, at 45.
134 Id.
135 See id. at 57.
136 See id. at 34.
137 Centesimus Annus, supra note 13, at 13.
138 Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes 17, reprinted in PROCLAIMING JUSTICE & PEACE: PAPAL
DOCUMENTS FROM RERUM NO0[ARUMTHROUGH CENTESIMUS ANNUS 157, 169 (Michael Walsh & Brian Davies eds.,
1991).
139 CATECHISM, supra note 9, at 1883.
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order to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate organizations can
do. , , 40
[Subsidiarity thus] suggests that people closest to the problem at hand are the ones with
the strongest moral claim to finding a solution. To empower higher authorities as
anything but second-best solutions or even last resorts endangers the rights and liberties
of those who are most affected. The subsidiarity pinciple also embodies the practical
point that those closest to the problem have the strongest interest in seeing that the
problem is solved most competently.
141
Subsidiarity does not imply the libertarian's night watchman state excluded from any
legitimate role in the economic sphere. 142 Instead, it implies the need for balance. Paul Johnson
observed of capitalism that:
The divine plan was indeed that we should enjoy the fruits of the earth and of our own
industry, and capitalism is the best way we have yet devised to organize the latter. But it
was equally the divine plan that God should be worshiped and obeyed and, not least,
feared. The fear of the Lord, in short, is the beginning of capitalist wisdom, as of any
other kind. 141
Yet, even so, when subordination of economic institutions to the state is viewed from a
perspective grounded in the principle of subsidiarity, it must be recognized as posing a grave144. ..
threat to personal liberty. Hence, minimizing state regulation of corporate governance is
essential to the preservation of a free, yet virtuous society. A limited state is an essential attribute
of ordered liberty. In a society premised on the principle of subsidiarity, private property and
freedom of contract are important not just in their own right, but iather because they provide
essential limitations on the power of the state. As Russell Kirk observed, "freedom and property
are closely linked: separate property from private possession, and Leviathan becomes master of
all." 145
III. CONCLUSION
Edmund Burke contended that individual reason could never fully comprehend the divine
intent, although we grope towards it through history, myth, fable, custom, and tradition. 146
Among these, custom and tradition have special value. They provide a solution for the risk of
value disagreement, which modern scholars typically regard as a major problem for natural law-
140 Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno 79, reprinted in PROCLAIMING JUSTICE & PEACE: PAPAL DOCUMENTS FROM
RERUMNOVARUM THROUGH CENTESIMUSANNUS41, 63 (Michael Walsh & Brian Davies eds. 1991).
141 Robert A. Sirico, Subsidiarity, Society, and Entitlements: Understanding and Application, 11 NOTRE DAME J. L.
ETHICS& PUB. POL'Y 549, 552 (1997).
142 See, e.g., Centesimus Annus, supra note 13, at 48.
143 Paul Johnson, Blessing Capitalism, COMMENTARY, May 1990, at 33, 36.
144 See, e.g., NOVAK, supra note 11, at 3 2-34.
145 RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND: FROM BURKE TO ELIOT 9 (7th ed. 1993).
146 See id. at 50.
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based jurisprudence.1 47 In particular, the customs and traditions of the community provide a
standard for identifying universal moral truths that does not require one to accept the claims of
any particular faith. Second, respect for tradition is closely linked to the virtue of prudence.
Burke echoed Plato in his assertion that prudence was the chief virtue of true statesmen. 148 When
the question of codifying purported mtural rights arises, prudence demands that the law of
unintended consequences be given its due. The prudent legislator is hesitant to promulgate
reforms that may give rise to new and unforeseen abuses worse than the evil to be cured. The
prudent legislator therefore respects tradition precisely because the enduring truths of what
Burke aptly called "original justice" are revealed slowly, with experience, over time. 149 The
individual is foolish, but the species is wise. We thus turn aside from ancient usage at our
peril. 150
These remarks on the value of prudence are relevant to the topic at hand precisely because
the Bishops' comments on the stakeholder debate were prudential rather than magisterial. It is
therefore especially appropriate for the laity to evaluate the prudential value of those comments.
This article argues that the modern corporation is a vital engine of both economic prosperity and
liberty. In turn, the shareholder wealth maximization norm is a central and well-established
component of the legal regime within which the corporation has made its valuable social
contributions. Prudence dictates continued adherence to that norm. Neither economic democracy
nor communitarian ideals justify a moral norm requiring directors to consider the interests of
nonshareholder constituencies when making corporate decisions. Instead, as we have seen,
modification of the shareholder wealth maximization norm is likely to lead to new abuses in the
form of exacerbated agency costs, which would benefit neither shareholders nor stakeholders.
147 See, e.g., Philip Soper, Some Natural Confusions about Natural Law, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2393, 2405 (1992)
(arguing that: "If we accept that natural law is just another way of claiming that ethical statements can be true or
false, then we will have to recognize that people who accept the theory can nevertheless reach different conclusions
about fundamental moral questions with no clear way of judging among them.").
148 See KIRK, supra note 145, at 22.
149 See Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Toleration in Edmund Burke's "Constitution of Freedom," 1995
SUP. CT. REV. 393, 403.
150 See RUSSELL KIRK, THE POLITICS OF PRUDENCE 251 (1993).
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